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PATENT JUDICIAL WISDOM
Srividhya Ragavan*
The project of harmonisation of patent laws around the world under the
aegis of the TRIPS Agreement has interacted with national policies and
objectives in respect of patents in both developed and developing countries.
This interaction has been mediated through the judiciary and the pervasive
influence of the judiciary has been essential for the success enjoyed so far.
However, the localised perspectives of the judiciary have also hindered the
global project ofharmonisation to a significant extent as divergent standards
and approaches have come forth in spite of similar statutory foundations.
This article seeks to analyse specific illustrations that highlight the interplay
between harmonisation and localisation in patent laws in developed and
developing countries as mediated through the judiciary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the milieu of the thoroughly researched Ayyangar Report, the Patents
Act of 1970 was a carefully crafted piece of legislation with ambitions to achieve
national objectives.' The health care needs of the Indian citizens formed the
background that prompted the enacting of the statute. In contrast, the patent law
amendments patches executed in India from 1999 are the by-product of
international pressure and reflect an international trade agenda. The minimum
standards outlined under the TRIPS agreement have set the background of the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law Center, Norman, Oklahoma.
Professor Ragavan can be reached at sragavaneou.edu, and her faculty profile can be
viewed at www.law.ou.edu/faculty.
1. The Patents Act, 1970.
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recent patent law amendments. Thus, these patent law amendments represent
India unleashed in the international arena - an India ready to address issues that
allegedly clog international trade relating to patented technology. Yet, the patent
statute as it exists in India requires clarity on the standards as well as the governing
procedures applicable to patents. Such clarity is vital for India to steer the patent
law amendments towards a balance between national objectives and international
obligations. The key question, now, is to determine which body - patent office,
judiciary, or legislature - shall be responsible for bringing clarity and vision to the
patent policy that is currently instituted out of a commitment to fulfil international
obligations. This question is not unique to India - other countries have faced similar
issues. For instance, in the 1980s, when concerns arose with respect to lack of
uniform standards for patents and the global competitiveness of the United States,
the solution from the legislature involved the judiciary? Consequently, a centralized
court was established to hear patent cases - the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (hereinafter, CAFC).A It is the CAFC that has been instrumental in charting
the highly pro-patent course of the US patent regime.4 In India too, the author
believes, it is the judiciary that would and should be entrusted with the task of
moulding a patent regime that suits its national objectives. Thus, the burden of
developing India's patent policy in context of India's national objectives lies with
the Indian judiciary.
In India, the challenge of developing patent policy is subject to one important
limitation -the Constitution of India. The values in the Constitution obligate India
to balance economic values with social needs? The balance between economic and
social development is critical for India to maintain and improve upon its growing
reputation and status in the world. Otherwise, a contemporary patent regime
disconnected with local realities would merely lead to further marginalization of
the poor. Similarly, affordable health care, an area likely to be affected by the patent
regime, is essential for India to maintain its niche capital - labour. The promotion
of innovation is also important to move towards the next stage of the development
paradigm.
2. A.B. JAFFE & J. LERNER, INNOVATON AND ITS DILscoTENTs 4 (2004).
3. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D 195 (1975). See United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov.
4. See JAFFE & LEmNER, supra note 2, at 16, 18.
5. INDiAN CONST. art. 39(b):
"The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing-
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so
distributed as best to subserve the common good."
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This paper discusses the role of the Indian Judiciary vis-A-vis the patent
regime, but carefully avoids creating an exhaustive wish list. Instead, this paper
uses illustrations from the United States to draw valuable lessons. Importantly,
the paper does not advocate that the Indian Judiciary emulate the United States
judiciary. In fact, conventional wisdom dictates that copying the policies or
precedents of the West does not always work in developing countries given the
stark differences in ground realities like poverty, investments, infrastructure, and
other such indicators. Instead, the judicial wisdom that characterises each of the
illustrations sets the common thread for the paper. The lesson lies in appreciating
the wisdom with which courts abroad have spearheaded amendments and set
standards for the patent regimes to achieve national objectives. Thus, this paper is
a compendium of stories outlining the role of the judiciary and its effects in
promoting, streamlining, or even disrupting the patent regime.
11. ILLUSTRATION 1: DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENT REGIME
The story of the American judiciary's role in fostering biotechnology cannot
be fully understood unless contrasted with what happened in Europe. In the 1960s
Europe faced the issue of patentability in modern biotechnology when a German
pigeon breeder sought a patent on a method of breeding a dovewith"a considerably
larger" red plumage.6 In refusing to grant a patent, the Bundesgerichtshof(German
Federal Supreme Court) explained that breeding was biological, rather than
technical because there was no guarantee of "reproducibility".7 Patentability
required the "technical nature" of the invention to control natural forces and achieve
a predicted result! The Bundesgerichtshof reemphasized the "reproduction"
6. Rote Taube IIC 01/1970 at 136, 137. (Judgment of March 27, 1967, Bundesgerichtshof,
52 Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 74 (Rote Taube)). A single patent claim
sought protection for crossing an Altdeutscher Krbpfer with a Rote Riimertaube. The
doves resulting from the selection were crossed with a Roter HessenkrOpfer, and then
with an Altdeutscher Kropfer.
7. Rote Taube, at 141. The court explained that the German Patent Act § 2(2) explicitly
denied patent protection for plant or animal varieties, or essentially biological processes
for the production of plants or animals. Arguably, the court's ruling implied that
replicable biotechnological inventions can be patented. See A. Schrell et al., Biotechnology
Patenting Policy in the European Union -as Exemplified by the Development in Germany,
107 ADv. BIocHrM ENGIN/BIoMrECNoL. 13 (2007), available at http//www.ncbi.nlm.nih.govL
pubmed/17522818.
8. Rote Taube, at 140. The court added that inventions should comprise "instructions] to
[a] systematic acting, by utilizing controllable natural forces to achieve a causally
predictable result",
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requirement in 1975 to refuse patent protection for a new mutant of baker's yeast
that produced beneficial results in bakery products.' Consequently, biotechnology
innovations remained unpatentable in Germany. During the 1970s and 1980s, in
some European nations, particularly Germany, a distrusting and even hostile attitude
prevailed towards biotechnology and, in particular, towards genetic engineering. 0
While Europe was fraught struggling with the patentability of biotechnology
innovations, Anand Chakrabarty a doctorate from the University of Calcutta,
landed in the United States for his post-doctoral work as an associate at the
University of Illinois." In the United States, Chakrabarty studied the ability of the
pseudomonas bacteria to use a wide variety of organic compounds as a source of
nutrition.2 During that period, he discovered that the genes that allowed the
bacteria to digest compounds such as camphor and octane (which did not reside
on the chromosome) resided on separate DNA elements - plasmids - that are
transmissible from one bacterium to another.'3 Much later, as an employee of
General Electric, it dawned on Chakrabarty that this ability of the pseudomonas
bacterium could be used to convert oil (which was then cheap) into biomass."
Since crude oil was a mixture of different hydrocarbons, Chakrabarty needed a
mixed culture of strains to degrade more components." Soon, Chakrabarty
constructed a pseudomonas strain with multiple plasmids.'6 Thus, the first oil eating
bacterium was born. The invention, as filed for a patent, consisted of genetically
transferred (camphor and octane degrading) plasmids into a single pseudomonas
bacterium to degrade crude oil." Chakrabarty's patent application claimed patents
on (1) the process of producing the bacteria, (2) the inoculum of carrier material
(e.g., straw to float on water with the bacteria) along with the plasmid-injected
pseudomonas, and (3) the pseudomonas itself.
9. See Bakers Yeast IC 02/1975; Bakers Yeast, Case X ZB 4/74, 208-211 (1975).
10. See A. Schrell et al., Biotechnology Patenting Policy in the European Union - as Exemplified
by the Development in Germany, 107 ADV. BIOCHEM. ENGINBIOTECHNoL. 13 (2007), available
at http://www.nebi.nlm.nih.gov/ pubmed/17522818.
11. R.S. Eisenberg, The Story of Diamond v. Chakrabarty: Technological Change and the Subject
Matter Boundaries of the Patent System in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STomES 327-357 (J. C.
Ginsburg & R.C. Dreyfuss eds., Foundation Press 2006).
12. lbid at 332.
13. Eisenberg, supra note 11.
14. Eisenberg, supra note 11.
15. Eisenberg, supra note 11,
16. Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 333.
17. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1972).
18. Diamond, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1972).
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The patent examiner at the USPTO allowed all claims except for the bacteria
on the reasoning that "micro-organisms are products of nature and living things
are not patentable subject matter under section 101 of Title 35 of the U.S.C." 19
Section 101 of Title 35, the operative provision, highlights that
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title?
When Chakrabarty appealed, the larger question for determination was
whether micro-organisms fall within the ambit of "manufacture or "composition
of matter" in § 101 of Title 35. If so, the micro-organism would be patentable. It is
important to note that the distinguishing feature of the invention was that the
subject matter was a non-naturally occurring product of human ingenuity.
By the time the USPTO's rejection of the patent application reached the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA- the predecessor of the CAFC), commercial
biotechnology was becoming a significant area of research. 21 By the time the
Supreme Court considered the case in 1979,? researchers had successfully "used
recombinant DNA technology to clone medically important genes in
microorganisms" .? In fact, Genetech Inc., the biotech company which cloned the
first human insulin in 1978, in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court asserted that
any controversy with respect to biotechnology was "misleading and irrelevant". 4
Further, Genetech added that:
Against a backdrop of active promotion of such research by European
governments and concern over possible loss of this country's
19. Diamond, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1972).
20. 35 U.S.C. §101.
21. In Re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d at 40. The defendant appealed USPTO's decision to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA). The CCPA's decision was vacated by a
certiorari and then the case was remanded to the CCPA. See Application of Chakrabarty,
596 F.2d at 952,
22. The government filed for certiorari for Chakrabarty and In Re Bergy - another case that
raised similar issues. After the petition was granted, the applicant in Bergy cancelled
his claims to the micro-organism. Hence, the court merely considered the Chakrabarty
issue. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
23. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 348.
24. Brief on Behalf of Genetech Inc as amicus curiae at 10 (Filed Jan 28, 1980).
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technological lead in the area, a spokesman for Congress' Office of
Technology Assessment has suggested that "government's stance may
change from regulation to promotion" of the science?
The Supreme Court, in considering the issue relating to the patentability of
living matter, held that the relevant distinction for determning patentability was
not between living and inanimate things but between products of nature, whether
living or not, and human-made inventions.6 The Court differentiated between
the original pseudomonas that were a product of nature, and the introduction of a
new genetic material capable of degrading oil into the bacterium that constituted
an invention? Thus, the Court posited the landmark proposition that all human
creativity, irrespective of living or otherwise, was eligible for patent protection.
By holding micro-organisms patentable under 35 U.S.C. §101, Diamond v.
Chakrabarty2 paved the way for the development of the biotechnology industry.
The availability of patent protection for genetic engineering, encouraged research
and development and marked the beginning of a new era in biotechnology
advances.? The Supreme Court's decision created tremendous a financial potential
for biotechnology companies, that in turn encouraged investment." Lila Feisee,
310's Director for Federal Government Relations and Intellectual Property,
highlighted that with the help of the Supreme Court decision in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty and the Bayh-Dole Act, the biotechnology industry had sky-rocketedY
Due to the forethought of thejudiciary the biotechnology industry particularly in
the United States, was poised for cataclysmic changes after Chakrabarty.
Several countries followed the Chakrabarty lead. Countries like Canada, for
instance, took the cue from Chakrabarty but created its own statutory interpretations
to suit national requirements. After the Chakrabarty decision, the Canadian patent
25. Ibid., at 11.
26. Diamond, 447 U.S. 303, at 305, 311-313 (1972).
27. Diamond, 447 U.S. 303, at 305,317 (1972).
28. Diamond, 447 U.S. 303, at 305, 318 (1972) (Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Powell dissented).
29. Diamond, 447 US. 303, at 305,311-313 (1972).
30. G. Yonover, What Math (Not) Chakrabarty Wrought: From The Mouse That Roared To Hello
Dolly And Beyond, 32 VAL. U.L. Rev. 349, 358 (1998).
31. Id.
32. L. Feisee, speech titled "Anything Under the Sun Made by Man", available at http://
www.bio.org/speeches/speeches/041101.asp (2001). (Director for Federal Government
Relations and intellectual Property of the Biotechnology Industry Organization
discussing the patent's contribution to the development of biotech industry).
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office dealt with a patent application concerning a genetically engineered mouse
(Harvard OncoMouse) containing an additional gene that makes the mice more
susceptible to cancer. The Harvard OncoMouse had already been granted patent
protection in the United States." In considering that the Oncomouse was patented
in the United States and Europe, the Canadian Appeals Court prioritised the
uniformity of patent law and held that Canada should also follow suit.,
Commentators have opined that economic pressure to promote the biotechnology
industry in Canada might have played a hidden role in the decision. 6 At that
time, Canada hosted the "second-largest biotechnology industry in the world",
and the abscence of patent protection for biotechnology embodied the danger of
hindering research and investment.37
Set in this background, it is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
that provides an important lesson. Unlike the Appeals Division, the Supreme Court
of Canada posited public interest considerations ahead of economic issues.3 1
"Parliament" declared the Supreme Court of Canada, "did not intend higher life
forms to be patentable" under the Canadian Patent Act.3 Hence, the Court declared
that the OncoMouse was an unpatentable subject matter.4
Canada and Europe are not the only examples of nations influenced by the
Chakrabarty decision. In fact, it is arguable that the Chakrabarty buzz caused the
Calcutta High Court in India to take the lead in Dimminaco AG 4 to protect
biotechnology inventions. When a patent was denied the process of manufacturing
a vaccine for infectious bursitis in poultry, DimminacoAG appealed the Patent Office
decision under section 116 of the Indian Patent Act, 1970.2 On appeal, the Calcutta
33. M. Kamber, Coming out of the Maze: Canada Grants the Harvard Mouse Patent, 35 GEo.
WASH. INf'L L. REV. 761 (2003).
34. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (1988).
35. President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Commissioner of Patents (2000) 4 F.C.
528 (Can.). See Kamber, supra note 33, at 761.
36. See Kamber, supra note 33, at 780.
37. Kamber, supra note 33, at 780.
38. Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), (2002) 4 S.C.R 45 (Can.). See
Kamber, supra note 33, at 780, 781.
39. Kamber, supra note 33, 780, 781.
40. Kamber, supra note 33, 780, 781.
41. Dimminaco A.G. v. Controller of Patents Designs, 2002 LP.R.L. 255 [Calcutta High
Court].
42. See Kolkata High Court Quashed Patent Controller's Order On Dimminaco AG's Bursitis
Vaccine, available at http://www.bionews.net/5/0/9/INDEX.HTM.
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High Court held that the definition of "manufacture" in section 2 of the Indian
Patent Act, 1970 did not place a statutory bar on the patentability of living
organisms In holding in this manner, Dimminaco AG" opened India to the world
of biotechnology patents."
At the time Dimminaco AG was decided, India reserved the right to deny
patent protection if the primary or intended use of the invention was contrary to
morality or is injurious to public health." Although no Indian case has addressed
the law and morality of the patentability of biotechnology, the "law or morality"
phrase in section 3 presumptively raises issues of patentability of biotechnology
materials. In reality, the Patents Act, 1970, did not exclude biotechnology patents,
but they were never granted. The Patents Act, 1970 in section 2(j) defined inventions
as (i) art, process or manner of manufacture, (ii) machine, apparatus or other article,
and (iii) substance produced by manufacture. 4' The Patent Office limited
patentability to "manufactured material or substances", and considered "living
organisms" as falling outside the scope of that definition." Just before the May
2002 Dimminaco AG decision, the South African AIDS crisis highlighted the
importance of the Indian generic drug industry and its biotechnology potential to
the world. Therefore, the same logic that had applied to the American judiciary
to promote biotechnology applied to India as well (subject to considerations of
national variations like access to medication). Dimminaco AG is a great beginning
not because it allowed biotechnology patents, but because it opened up the
biotechnology sector at a time when India's potential in biotechnology was
becoming well known around the world.
43. See Manufacture Applies To Living Organism; HC - Boost To Biotech Patenting, Busmss
LINE, available at http://www.patentmatics.com/news2002/ news25.htm (discussing that
patentability requirements like "novelty" were satisfied by the process for preparation,
and "utility" was satisfied by the vaccine's protection against contagious bursitis
infection in poultry).
44. Dimminaco, 2002 LP.R.L. 255, 259 [Calcutta High Court].
45. Dimminaco, 2002 I.P.R.L. 255,258 & 293 [Calcutta High Court]. Justice Ashok Ganguly
quashed the Controller's order and directed a reconsideration of the application. The
Central Government decided not to challenge the ruling; thus, the judgment of the
Calcutta High Court is the authority in India on the issue of biotechnology patents.
46. The Patents Act, 1970.
47. The Patents Act, 1970.
48. Section2(j), Patents Act, 1970 reads: "The definition of invention includes (i) art, process
or manner of manufacture, (ii) machine, apparatus or other article, (iii) substance
produced by manufacture".
49. See J. Slater, Indian Pirates Turn Partners: Once Copycats, its Drug Makers Emerge As
Industry Power Houses, WALL ST. J[, Nov 13, 2003, at A14.
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I1. ILLUSTRATION 2: JUDICIARY KEEPING THE PATH CLEAR
FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTING
Judicial interpretations, which outline the second illustration, are naturally
influenced by national cultural, social and economic norms. Even in the developed
world, the judiciary has had to deal with moral and ethical concerns in
biotechnology patents. For example, before the European Patent Office (EPO)"
could examine a patent application for the genetically engineered Harvard
Oncolousei it had to deal with massive protests across Europe that delayed the
prosecution of the application." More than two hundred organizations, including
animal welfare groups, environmental organizations, and religious societies, had
opposed the application on moral and ethical grounds." Similarly, in the case of
Relaxin," a patent application for the DNA fragment encoding human H2-relaxin
(and its precursors) was opposed as offending the provisions of "morality' and
"ordre public" in Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention." The extraction
of the DNA encoding the relaxin gene, for which the patent was sought, from the
tissue of a pregnant woman, was alleged to be immoral, and constituting an offence
against human dignity.6 In dealing with the question, the EPO clarified that the
"morality" requirement of Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention is
violated if "the public would regard the invention as so abhorrent that the grant of
patent rights would be inconceivable"? The patent was eventually granted for
relaxin, although the decision introduced an element of subjectivity in determining
50. E.P.0. O. 6 (1977).
51. Harvard/Onco-Mouse 10019/90; See 1990 O.J. E.P.O. 476 (Tech. Bd. App.) (1990); Eur.
Pat. Off. Rep 501, 502. The Harvard Onco-Mouse is the first case where the E.PO.
approved patenting a transgenic mammalby holding that the E.RC. does not exclude
the patenting of animals as a category per se.
52. See D.M. Gitter, International Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences In The
United States And The European Union: An Argument For Compulsory Licensing And A
Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1623, 1647 (2001).
53. See D.M. Gitter, Led Astray By The Moral Compass: Incorporating Morality Into European
Union Biotechnology Patent Law, 19 BERKLEY J. INTL. 1, 29 (2001).
54. Howard Florey Institute v. Fraktion der Gronen irn europCischen Parlament, V0008/
94.
55. Howard Florey Institute v. Fraktion der Gronen im europCischen Parlament, V0008/94.
56. Howard Florey Institute v. Fraktion der Gronen im europCischen Parlament, V0008/94.
57. The European Patent Convention (hereinafter, EPC) created a bundle of European
patent rights with effect in European countries designated by the applicant. Article
53 of the EPC specifically discusses "exceptions to patentability". Article53(a) exempts
from patentability inventions that affect "morality" and ordre public as follows:
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the issues of morality in patentability. While it is arguable that morality discussions
prevented Europe from forging a strong biotechnology patent regime," it is equally
true that economic issues notwithstanding, courts cannot shy away from
confronting issues of local importance.
In the United States too, the judiciary was confronted with the moral and
ethical concerns regarding the patenting of living organisms, wwhich were raised
by the Animal Defense Fund, a non-profit organization comprising several
individual farmers.? The Federal Circuit reasoned that under Article III, §2 of the
United States Constitution, locus standi is established'O only for parties with either
a threat of personal injury or an actual personal injury.61 The alleged injury to
farmers as a class, the Federal Circuit held, was due to increased competition from
commercialization of genetically improved animals and not from the grant of
patents. Since the appellants asserted no other adverse effects on any individual
rights under the patent, the suit was dismissed for lack of standing? Thus, the
CAFC's refusal to indulge into the ethical and social policies underlying patenting
of living organisms enabled the U.S. to steer clear of questions that caused a furore
in Europe, thus maintaining the focus on promoting biotechnology." In effect,
[I]nventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to "ordre
public" or morality provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so
contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the
Contracting States.
58. See Gitter, supra note 52, at 1653, 1654. For example, British researchers collaborating
with Americans, as part of an international team of scientists, ceased working together
because of a disagreement over the ethics of patenting DNA. Mike Stratton, head of
the ICR research team, explained that the British researchers "do not believe pieces of
the human genome are inventions; we feel it is aform of colonization to patent them", adding
that he did not believe it "appropriate for [a disease gene] to be owned by a commercial
company because, in contrast to an academic organization or a charity, there inevitably is a
demand for profit".
59. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 922 (1991).
60. See U.S. Const. art. I 5 2 (discussing the scope of Judicial power).
61. Animal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d at 925. The court held that standing under Article III §
2 is established when a party "at an irreducible minimum", proves (1) "that he
personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively
illegal conduct" (personal injury), (2) that "the injury 'fairly can be traced to the
challenged action"' (causation), and (3) that the injury "is likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision" (effective relief).
62. Animal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d at 925.
63. Animal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d at 935-9.
64. Animal Defense Fund, 932 F.2d at 935-9. See M.J. ADELMAN ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS
oN PATENT LAW 162 (1998),
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while the Supreme Court paved the way for the protection of biotechnology, the
CAFC was instrumental in the United States in ensuring that biotechnology was
not bogged down by stumbling blocks.
In developing countries like India, biotechnology questions rarely relate
to patentability of the subject matter. Partly, patentability of biotechnology
has ceased to be a contentious issue and also because exclusions are clearly
outlined under section 3(d).65 Nevertheless, questions repeatedly arise in
context of the balance required between promoting trade and protecting
national welfare issues. To its credit, the Indian judiciary has shown a
remarkable ability to draw the welfare lines, where required. Justice Bhat's
decision in Roche v. Cipla" that enunciated a judicial compulsory licensing
is an excellent example. Cipla, the generic drug maker, challenged Roche's
patent on erlotinib - sold as Tarceva and priced at Rs.4,800 per tablet - on the
grounds that the compound was obvious in light of the earlier known gefitinib.
The decision established that, unlike the United States, the patent holder in
India is not automatically entitled to an interim injunction when the validity
of the patent is challenged. If a generic manufacturer can prove that the
patented drug is priced more than the generic drug, or that the patented drug
is not locally manufactured (several MNC drugs would be covered)67 or that
the generic has commenced manufacturing the drug,"' then an interim
injunction can be obtained. In doing so, the judgment prevents inventors from
protecting minor innovations and then waiting for such patents to be squashed
by the courts at the cost of judicial time and tax-payer's money. It also
establishes that in India, access to medication will remain an important
consideration in patent law and policy. Other decisions, like the Novartis
decision, have clarified the standards of what kind of efficacy is required for
unknown forms of known compounds to be elevated as an invention." In
India, decisions like the Roche judgment and the Novartis judgment are
absolutely essential to create a balance that caters to national objectives.
65. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005.
66. Hoffman La Roche Ltd and Anr. v. Cipla Ltd., 2008 P.T.C. 71 [Delhi High Court].
67. See Spicy IP discussions on Roche v. Cipla, available at www.SpicylPIndia. blogspot.com.
68. Hoffrnan La Roche, 2008 P.T.C. 71.
69. Novartis AG & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 4 M.L.J. 1153 (2007).
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IV. ILLUSTRATION 3: THE JUDICIARY DEVELOPING THE NON-
OBVIOUSNESS JURISPRUDENCE
Just like India's struggle in Novartis over the question of what qualities elevate
a novel and useful material to an invention, the United States has dealt with similar
questions during the initial stages of patent development, and even later. Before
the enactment of §103 of Title 35, the United States'patent regime was characterized
by a distinct lack of a principled analysis of what distinctions with respect to the
prior art amounted to an "inventive" activity.? In Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham
Mfg. Co.,"' the Court held that patentable inventions "spring from that intuitive
faculty of the mind put forth in the search for new results, or new methods, creating
what had not before existed"? Justice Hand characterized the conceptual view of
an "invention" as "fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists
in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts".7m
Despite the belief that a strong patent system was the central tenet of a free
market, economic downturns in the United States typically caused a mistrust of
the patent regime!4 The economic depression of 1873, for instance, increased
concerns about the power of "big business" resulting in the Sherman Antitrust
Act in 1890.75 Similarly, the Great Depression of the 1930s resulted in the patent
system being viewed as assisting monopolies 6 During this time, even the judiciary
viewed patents with limited enthusiasm? The Supreme Court's propensity to strike
down patents was so high that Justice Jackson lamented in Jungerson v. Ostby &
Barton Co.," "The only patent that is valid is one which this court has not been
able to get its hands on"?
70. See S.G. Kalinchak, Obviousness and the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: Striving
for Objective Criteria, 43 CATH. U.L. REv, 577, 582-583 (1994) (discussing the "Supreme
Court's reluctance to define a principled and objective test" for patentability prior to the
Patent Law of 1954).
71. Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59 (1885).
72. Hollister, 113 U.S. 59, 72 (1885).
73. See Harries v. Air King Prods. Co, 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).
74. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989). See 13
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 335 (1904).
75. See Ladas & Parry, A Brief History of the Patent Law of the United States, available at http://
www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistoryhtmL See also ShermanAct, 15 U.S.CA. §2(1890).
76. Ladas and Parry, supra note 75.
77. Adelman, supra note 64, at 23 (addressing how misplaced antitrust priorities, and the
subjective inventiveness test, ultimately caused general mistrust of patents).
78. Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co, 335 U.S. 560 (1949).
79. Jungerson, 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949).
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Interestingly, the cautious steps that the United States judiciary took during
periods of depression are similar to those that the Indian judiciary is currently
taking. The well-publicised Novartis dispute stands as an example of the cautious
undertone of the Indian judiciary adopted to avoid patents with respect to frivolous
and minor innovations. The dispute relates to a rejection by the Indian patent
office of an application filed by drug manufacturer Novartis for a cancer drug
named Glivec under section 3(d) of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2005 (the
Act).80 Section 3(d) excludes new forms of a known substance - like salts, esters,
ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, ... etc., from
patentability - unless it embodies an enhanced efficacy."1 The facts indicate that
Glivec was an isomer of an existing compound and the Madras High Court
sustained the examiner's opinion, that is, that it lacked the requisite efficacy to
make it patentable.82 The Novartis dispute inter alia underlines the attempt of
the Indian Judiciary to standardize the efficacy requirement to determine non-
obviousness of innovations.
In the United States, 35 U.S.C under §103 directs the courts to determine
patentability by an objective comparison of the claimed invention with prior art.
The Supreme Court, in 1966, conceptualized the test for non-obviousness in a trilogy
of cases based on the scope and content of prior art, the differences between prior
art and the claims at issue and the level of "ordinary skill" in the art at the time the
invention was made." In 1969, however, another Supreme Court decision,
Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co." developed the test of
80. A. O'Connor, Activists Protest at Novartis's Patent Law Challenge, TIMEs (U.K.), March 7,
2007, at 59. See Patents (Amendment) Act (2005), available at http;//
www.patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/ patent_2005.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Novartis AG v. Union of India 4 M.L.J. 1153 (2007) [Madras High Court].
83. 35 U.S.C. §103.
84. See Calmar Inc. v. Cook Chemical Co., 383 U.S. 1, 26 (1966) (refusing patentability to
a sprayer since the invention was based on non-technical differences well known in
the art); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 112 (1966) (invalidating a plow clamp
due to lack of operative mechanical distinctions between the invention and prior art);
United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966). See K.N. McKereghan, Comment, The
Nonobviousness of Inventions: In Search of a Functional Standard, 66 WASH. L. REv. 1061
(1991).
85. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57,61(1969) (explaining
the "synergism" test by stating that "[A] combination of elements may result in an
effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately") Although the
invention (an asphalt paving machine) was a commercial success, the Court
determined that it lacked "synergism".
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"synergism". The Court held that a mere combination of old elements would
become obvious unless it produces a "synergistic effect" The synergism rule
increased the subjectivity of interpretation, resulting in conflicting and uncertain
decisions from the regional circuits? The conflicts within the regional circuit courts
led Congress to appoint the Hruska Commission," which resulted in the
establishment of the CAFC in 1982. The CAFC evolved a new test for determining
prima facie obviousness. Under this test, an invention (that is a combination of
known elements) would be non-obvious and therefore patentable unless there is
some specific teaching, suggestion or motivation (TSM) in the prior art that refers
to that combination. The TSM test, especially relevant to pharmaceutical
formulations, has resulted in some questionable inventions clearing the non-
obviousness threshold. As recently as 2007, the Supreme Court weighed in
unfavourably on the TSM test in KSR v Teleflex by declaring that the "combination
of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it
does no more than yield predictable results" 90
Particularly in biotechnology, the judiciary in the U.S has had to calibrate
its standards and closely relate it to practical effects and industrial development
taking place. For example, after the Chakrabarty decision, the CAFC held in Re
Deuel, that an isolated DNA molecule is prima facie nonobvious and hence
patentable although a combination of prior art references about the general method
of gene cloning, together with a reference disclosing a partial amino acid sequence
of the protein were present."' The lowering of the obviousness standard for
biotechnology patents in Deuel promoted patents and caused companies to race
86. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
87. Adelman, supra note 64, at 24.
88. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975).
89. By 1978, the Department of Justice proposed merging the Court of Clairns with the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals into a single appellate structure with national
jurisdiction over all patent appeals. In 1979, the Senate Judicial Committee approved
the Improvements in the Administration of Justice Bill which, in 1982, established the
Federal Circuit. See Judge R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM.
U. L. REv. 1003 (1991) (discussing whether the Federal Circuit is a specialized court);
R.C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1 (1989) (critically appraising the role of the Federal Circuit).
90. KSR International Co., v. Teleflex, Ic, 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
91. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1557-8 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Structural claims were used in the
patent application. The Courtnoted that structural similarity between the compounds
in the prior art and the claims may provide a basis for an obviousness rejection by
establishing a motivation to make the claimed compound.
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to obtain biotechnology patents resulting in several innovations." Deuel greatly
helped the United States to lead in the field of biotechnology patents and prosper
from a rapidly growing biotechnology industry."
In making the standard of obviousness weaker for biotechnology patents,
Deuel also enabled the patenting of miniscule inventions. 4 It later resulted in a
"spiral of overlapping patent claims in thehands of different owners".9 Patent owners
blocked each other's research resulting in the under-use of resources." Consequently,
the system of free-for-all biotechnology patent applications had to be halted.9 Again,
the CAFC stepped in to limit the overly broad biotechnology patents in Regents of
the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. by creating a heightened written
description requirement" In doing so, the Court created a specific written description
requirement for biotechnology patent applications. Every biotechnology patent
application now required a detailed written description with a specific description
of the genes along with their distinguishing structural features.9
The fine-tuning of the biotechnology patent regime and the non-obviousness
standards in the United States by various courts - the Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit - exemplifies the burden on the judiciary to cautiously guide policies to
92. S.A. Upadhyaya, The Postmodern Written Description Requirements: An Analysis of the
Application of the Heightened Written Description Requirement to Original Claims, 4 MwN.
INTELL. PRoP. REv. 65, 107-9 (2002). See S. Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Non-obviousnes
Standard for Gene Patents: Protecting Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTERL.
Pnormn. L. REv. 143, 178 (2000).
93. Upadhyaya, supra note 92, at 109.
94. Upadhyaya, supra note 92, at 109.
95. Upadhyaya, supra note 92, at 109.
96. M.A. Heller & R.S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anti-Commons In
Biomedical Research, SCIENCE MAG., MAY 1, 1998, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/
cgi/content/abstract/280/5364/698.
97. Upadhyaya, supra note 92, at 109.
[B]etween 1990 and 1998, the total number of biotechnology patents granted
to U.S. corporations has quadrupled. In contrast, between 1990 and 1998,
the total number of patents issued increased by about sixty percent. This
large disparity is cause for concern. It suggests that the biotechnology
industry is using the relaxed nonobviousness standard to obtain genomic
patents simply for corporate gain.
See also Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 92.
98. University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (1997); See Upadhyaya,
supra note 92, at 109.
99. Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-7 (1997)
(quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F. 2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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achieve national objectives. In developing nations like India, the judiciary should
adopt a clear objective, that is, to focus policies on national needs. The judiciary
should ensure that statutory amendments that are made to comply with
international treaties incorporate appropriate standards and procedures to achieve
national objectives.
V. CONCLUSION
The lessons from the illustrations above lie in appreciating the nature of
judicial interpretation. Lord Denning termed judges as by-products of
"predilections and preconceived notions" These predilections and preconceived
notions are reflections of the national socio-economic and political influences.
Judgments rendered without due consideration to national social, cultural and
policy differences lack the degree of realism required to achieve national objectives.
In the area of patents in particular, where all members of the WTO subscribe to
minimum standards of protection, it is easy for the legislature or the judiciary to
emulate another country However, "drafting similar laws does not necessitate
making the same interpretive decisions". In fact, case law can develop in wholly
different ways despite similar statutory construction and despite the influence of
another country's jurisprudence.1 Reckless judgments rendered without the full
appreciation of realities cause more harm than good. In fact, the problem of the
anti-commons in biotechnology patents in the United States itself is a reflection of
ambitious judgments that failed to balance economic considerations with other
reasonable considerations. While it is important for the judiciary in India to not
create stumbling blocks for investments, it is equally important that the judiciary
does not act as an investment promoter to the detriment of social issues. The burden
on the Indian judiciary is high but there is every reason to believe that it can fully
stand up to the challenge.
100. See Kamber, supra note 33, at 779.
101. Kamber, supra note 33, at 779.
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